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Abstract—In this paper, we study secure transmission designs
for underlay cognitive radio networks in the present of randomly
distributed eavesdroppers. We consider the scenario where a
secondary transmitter sends confidential messages to a secondary
receiver subject to an interference constraint set by the primary
user. We design two transmission protocols under different chan-
nel knowledge assumptions at the transmitter. For each protocol,
we first give a comprehensive performance analysis to investigate
the transmission delay, secrecy, and reliability performance. We
then optimize the transmission design for maximizing the secrecy
throughput subject to both secrecy and reliability constraints.
Finally, we numerically compare the performance of the two
transmission protocols.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, cognitive radio networks,
threshold-based transmission, secrecy guard zone.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) has been regarded as a promising
technology to solve the problem of inefficient spectrum usage
to address the conflict between spectrum scarcity and spectrum
underutilization [1, 2]. In CR networks, unlicensed secondary
users (SUs) are allowed to access the spectrum of licensed
primary users (PUs) with the requirement of not interfering the
PUs. Allowing the spectrum sharing in the CR network makes
the CR networks intrinsically non-secure. The coexistence of
licensed and unlicensed users in the same network makes the
data transmissions more vulnerable to security attacks [3]. To
address this concern, innovative security technologies have
been proposed for CR networks [3]. As a complement to
the traditional cryptographic techniques [4], physical layer
security (PLS) has been widely studied [5, 6] to secure the
wireless transmissions by exploiting the fading characteristics
of wireless channels. The information-theoretic performance
of PLS in CR networks has been analyzed in, e.g., [7–9]. The
signal processing technique to improve PLS in CR networks
has been investigated in, e.g., [10–12].
Although increasing amount of attention has been paid to
the issue of PLS in CR networks, most of current studies are
still based on some simplified and idealized assumptions. For
example, all of the aforementioned work [7–12] assumed that
either the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is
perfectly known at the legitimate side or the network consists
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of only a very small number of eavesdroppers with known
locations. In practice, an external eavesdropper would not
reveal its CSI or location information to the legitimate side,
and hence such assumptions are not always valid [13].
Taking into account potentially a large number of eaves-
droppers inside the network at random and possibly changing
locations (due to mobility), a common analytical approach is
to model the location set of eavesdroppers to be a stochastic
process following some distributions [14–16]. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, the consideration of randomly
distributed eavesdroppers has been rarely discussed in CR
networks with a few exceptions. In [17] and [18], Shu. et
al considered that the message to the PU is confidential and
derived the secrecy capacity in the presence of randomly
distributed eavesdroppers whose location set is modeled as
a homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP). However, the
work in [17] and [18] considered a simplified channel model
consisting of only the pass loss effect, while the fading effect is
not considered. It is important to note that the performance of
secure communication is very different between a fading and a
non-fading scenario. Furthermore, the presence of fading can
be smartly utilized to achieve a better secrecy performance.
In this paper, we study the problem of achieving PLS in an
underlay CR network where a secondary transmitter (SU-Tx)
sends confidential information to a secondary receiver (SU-Rx)
over a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel in the present of
multiple eavesdroppers. To satisfy the interference constraint,
the transmit power at the SU-Tx is carefully adjusted, which
is determined by the instantaneous channel condition from the
SU-Tx to the primary receiver (PU-Rx). The location set of
the eavesdroppers is modeled as a HPPP. We consider two
transmission protocols to achieve the secure transmission in
the CR network: the secrecy guard zone protocol and the
threshold-based protocol. The secrecy guard zone protocol is
applicable for the scenario where the SU-Tx can detect the
existence of eavesdroppers in its vicinity. The threshold-based
protocol is applicable for the scenario where the SU-Tx can
obtain a one-bit feedback from the SU-Rx. For each transmis-
sion protocol, we comprehensively evaluate the performance
of transmission delay, secrecy, and reliability. Moreover, we
optimize the designs of transmission protocols based on the
performance analysis. To this end, we study the optimization
problem of maximizing secrecy throughput subject to secrecy
and reliability constraints. Finally, we numerically compare the
performance of the two transmission protocols. We find that
the secrecy guard zone protocol is preferred when the secrecy
constraint is stringent while the threshold-based protocol is
preferred when the reliability constraint is stringent.
It is worth mentioning that the concept of secrecy guard
zone protocol has been previously studied in, e.g., [14, 15,
19], and the concept of similar threshold-based protocol has
been previously investigated in, e.g., [20, 21]. Different from
the existing results in [14, 15, 19], our proposed secrecy guard
zone protocol is applicable in the CR network where the SU-
Tx has an adaptive transmit power. Most importantly, none
of [14, 15, 19] has studied the optimal design of the secrecy
guard zone. In contrast, we have derived the optimal radius
of the guard zone that maximizes the secrecy throughput.
Note that the optimal design of the radius is very important
for the performance of the secrecy guard zone protocol.
Different from the existing results in [20, 21], our proposed
threshold-based protocol is specifically designed for the CR
network where the SU-Tx has an adaptive transmit power.
The consideration of adaptive transmit power at the SU-Tx
protects the primary network from interference by ensuring a
low interference power received at the primary user. We have
derived the optimal design of the threshold value, which is
dependent on the conditions of both the channel from SU-Tx
to PU-Rx and the channel from SU-Tx to SU-Rx. Although
the optimal SNR threshold has also been designed in [21], the
result in [21] cannot be applied in the secure CR network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
We consider an underlay CR network that consists of a
primary transmitter-receiver pair and a secondary transmitter-
receiver pair. The SU-Tx sends confidential messages to the
SU-Rx in the present of multiple movable eavesdroppers,
which are denoted by {Ej |j = 1, 2, · · ·}. We assume that the
eavesdroppers are randomly distributed in the network. The
location set of the eavesdroppers, denoted by ΦE , is modeled
as a HPPP with density λE . The primary network allows the
secondary network to share the spectrum by underlay method,
and requires that the instantaneous interference power at the
PU-Rx from the SU-Tx is lower than a threshold, denoted
by I0. We further assume that all communication nodes have
a single antenna and the wireless communication channel
is modeled as a path-loss plus quasi-static Rayleigh fading
channel. Denote the transmitter power at SU-Tx as P . Then,
the received signal to noise ratios (SNRs) at the SU-Rx and
eavesdropper Ej are given by
γD =
P
σ2D
|hSD|2 d−αSD (1)
and
γEj =
P
σ2Ej
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2 d−αSEj , (2)
respectively, where α ≥ 2 denotes the path loss exponent,
dSD and dSEj denote the distance from SU-Tx to SU-Rx
and the distance from SU-Tx to Ej , respectively, σ2D and
σ2Ej denote additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) variances
at SU-Rx and Ej , respectively, with σ2D = σ
2
Ej
= σ2. In
addition, hSD and hSEj denote the channel coefficients for the
channel from SU-Tx to SU-Rx and the channel from SU-Tx
to Ej , respectively, which are modeled as complex Gaussian
variables with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., CN (0, 1).
Following a widely-adopted assumption, we consider that
the interference from the primary transmitter (PU-Tx) at the
SU-Rx or the eavesdropper is neglectable [9, 11, 22–24]. A
practical example that approximates this occurrence is the
scenario where the PU-Tx is located far away from the SU
nodes [23].
We assume that the receiver side (including the PU-Rx,
the SU-Rx and the eavesdroppers) has the perfect CSI. We
consider a scenario where the PU-Rx is a cellular base station
which is capable of instantaneous CSI feedback to both the
PU-Tx and the SU-Tx, while the SU-Rx is not capable of full
CSI feedback. Specifically, the PU-Rx feeds back to the SU-
Tx with the instantaneous channel gain, denoted by hSP ∼
CN (0, 1), to enable the SU-Tx to adjust its transmit power
to satisfy the interference constraint. This can be achieved
through a spectrum-band manager that mediates between the
licensed and unlicensed users [25]. Although the SU-Rx is not
capable of full CSI feedback, we consider the possibility of a
low-complexity feedback scheme in which the SU-Rx uses one
bit to inform SU-Tx about its channel condition. The external
eavesdroppers are totally passive, and hence their CSI is not
revealed to SU-Tx. To satisfy the instantaneous interference
constraint, I0, the SU-Tx adjusts the transmit power to
P =
I0
|hSP |2 d−αSP
1(condition), (3)
where dSP denotes the distance from SU-Tx to PU-Rx. The
1(condition) in (3) denotes an indicator function for whether
the transmission is “on” or “off” at SU-Tx, which is given by
1(condition) =
{
1, if the condition holds
0, otherwise,
(4)
where the condition in (4) depends on the specifical transmis-
sion protocol. We highlight that having such an on-off trans-
mission strategy can effectively improve the secrecy and/or the
reliability performance, which will be shown later in Sections
III and V.
For a robust analysis, we consider that all eavesdroppers
can collude and exchange information. Thus, the multiple
eavesdroppers can be regarded as a single eavesdropper, Ejoint,
with multiple distributed antennas. The equivalent receive SNR
at the Ejoint is given by
γE =
P
σ2
∑
Ej∈ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . (5)
From (1) and (5), we note that γD and γE have the same power
variable P , which makes them correlated with each other. For
convenience, we define ZΦE =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj .
B. Secure Encoding
The SU-Tx uses the widely-adopted wiretap code [26] to
encode the confidential messages. Let C (RB , RS) denote the
set of all possible Wyner codes, where RB is the codeword
transmission rate and RS is the confidential information rate
with RB > RS . The rate difference RB−RS reflects the cost
of securing the message against eavesdropping. We assume
that the encoding rates have already been designed, and hence
RB and RS are fixed. Such a fixed-rate transmission scheme
is suitable for practical applications requiring low complexity,
e.g., video streams in multimedia.
C. Outage Probability Metrics
In the following, we detail the outage definitions for char-
acterizing the transmission delay, the secrecy performance
and the reliability performance of the network. Moreover, we
propose a new probability metric to comprehensively evaluate
the joint performance of secrecy and reliability.
1) TP: Since the transmission may not always happen at
SU-Tx depending on the transmission protocol, there exists a
probability of transmission referred to as TP, which is given
by
ptx = P
(
1(condition) = 1
)
, (6)
where P(·) denotes the probability measure. We adopt the
probability of transmission as the metric of the delay perfor-
mance.
2) SOP and COP: With the fixed-rate wiretap code, there
are two kinds of outage events [21, 27]: secrecy outage event
and connection outage event. The secrecy outage happens
when the perfect secrecy of transmission is not achieved, and
the probability of the secrecy outage referred to as SOP is
given by [21]
pso = P
(
CE > RB −RS |1(condition) = 1
)
, (7)
where CE = log (1 + γE) denotes the channel capacity of
Ejoint. The connection outage happens when the received
message cannot be decoded at the intended receiver without
error, and the probability of the connection outage referred to
as COP is given by
pco = P
(
CB < RB |1(condition) = 1
)
, (8)
where CB = log (1 + γD) denotes the channel capacity of the
secondary link. We adopt the SOP as the metric of the secrecy
performance and the COP as the metric of the reliability
performance.
3) TSOP: From (7) and (8), we note that the secrecy and
reliability become correlated in the considered CR network
due to the correlation between γD and γE . Therefore, it is
necessary to comprehensively study the joint performance of
the secrecy and the reliability. To this end, we propose a
new outage performance metric, namely transmission secrecy
outage probability (TSOP). The TSOP characterizes the proba-
bility that either secrecy outage or connection outage happens,
which is given by
ptso=1−P
(
CE≤RB−RS , CB≥RB |1(condition) = 1
)
. (9)
We highlight that the TSOP takes the mutual correlation
between the SOP and the COP into account. A similar concept
of jointly measuring secrecy and reliability performance can be
found in another widely-adopted outage probability definition,
i.e., pout = P (CS < RS) [28], where CS denotes the secrecy
capacity. Compared with ptso in (9), the pout in [28] has not
taken into account the transmission rate of codewords and the
condition under which message transmission happens.
D. Secrecy Throughput
The overall performance of the system is measured by
the secrecy throughput taking into account the transmission
delay, the secrecy performance and the reliability performance
together. The secrecy throughput is given by
η = ptx (1− ptso)RS , (10)
where ptx is the TP in (6) and ptso is the TSOP in (9). As
such, the secrecy throughput in (10) quantizes the average
secrecy rate at which the messages are securely and reliably
transmitted to SU-Rx.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION PROTOCOLS
We study two secure transmission protocols which are
secrecy guard zone protocol and threshold-based protocol. The
secrecy guard zone protocol is applicable for the scenario
where the SU-Tx can detect the existence of eavesdroppers in
its vicinity and the threshold-based protocol is applicable for
the scenario where the SU-Tx can obtain a one-bit feedback
from SU-Rx.
A. Secrecy Guard Zone Protocol
For the secrecy guard protocol, we consider the scenario
where the SU-Tx is able to detect the existence of eavesdrop-
pers within a finite range. As per the mechanism of secrecy
guard zone [19, 29], we model the finite range around the SU-
Tx as a secrecy guard circle B with radius r. The SU-Tx trans-
mits messages only when there is no eavesdropper detected in-
side the guard circle. Thus, the condition in (4) for the secrecy
guard zone protocol is that no eavesdropper is detected inside
the secrecy guard zone, i.e.,
{
C1 : ∀Ej ∈ ΦE , dSEj > r
}
.
We denote the location of the SU-Tx as the origin o. Then,
the secrecy guard zone around the SU-Tx with radius r is
denoted by B (o, r). Note that the number of eavesdroppers
inside B (o, r), denoted by N , is a Poisson random variable
with mean πr2λE . Thus, its probability mass function (PMF)
is given by
P (N = n) = exp
(−πr2λE) (πr2λE)n
n!
. (11)
Then, the TP is derived as
ptx = P (N = 0) = exp
(−πλEr2) . (12)
Substituting (1) into (8) with condition C1, the COP for the
secrecy guard zone protocol is given by
pco = P
(
|hSD|2<
(
2RB−1)σ2dαSD
I0dαSP
|hSP |2
)
=
(
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
. (13)
Denote Φ˜E as the new location set of the eavesdroppers for the
scenario where the transmission happens, i.e., no eavesdropper
is inside the secrecy guard zone. Then, the received SNR at
the eavesdropper Ejoint for the scenario where the transmission
happens is given by γE = Pσ2
∑
Ej∈˜ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . Here, we
define Z
˜ΦE
=
∑
Ej∈˜ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . Thus, the SOP for the
secrecy guard zone protocol is derived as
pso = P
(
log2
(
1 +
I0Z˜ΦE
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
)
> RB −RS
)
= 1− LZ
˜ΦE
(
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (14)
We can further derive the Laplace transform of Z
˜ΦE
as
LZ
˜ΦE
(s)=exp
[
− 2
α
πλEs
2/αB(rαs−1+1)−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
)]
, (15)
where Bx (p, q) =
∫ x
0
tp−1 (1− t)q−1 dt is the incomplete
Beta function. For brevity, the detailed derivation is omitted
here. Then, the closed-form expression for the SOP can be
obtained by substituting (15) into (14). Based on (1), (5) and
(9), the TSOP for the secrecy guard zone protocol is derived
as
ptso = 1− I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
· LZ
˜ΦE
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (16)
B. Threshold-Based Protocol
In the threshold-based protocol, we assume that the SU-
Tx can obtain a one-bit feedback from the SU-Rx to enable
a threshold-based transmission. Specifically, the SU-Tx trans-
mits only when the received SNR at SU-Rx is larger than a
predetermined threshold μ. Otherwise, the SU-Tx suspends the
transmission. To this end, the SU-Rx sends an instantaneous
one-bit feedback to the SU-Tx for indicating whether the
received SNR is larger the threshold μ. Thus, the condition
in (4) for the threshold-based protocol is that the SNR at the
SU-Rx is larger than μ, i.e.,
{
C2 :
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
> μ
}
.
The SU-Tx transmits only when γD is larger than the
predetermined threshold μ ∈ [0,∞). Thus, the TP is given
by
ptx = P (C2 : γD > μ) =
I0d
α
SP
μσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
. (17)
Note that only when μ ∈ [0, 2RB − 1), the connection outage
exists. Substituting (1) into (8), the COP for μ ∈ [0, 2RB − 1)
is derived as
pco =
P
(
μσ2dαSD
I0dαSP
|hSP |2< |hSD|2< (2
RB−1)σ2dαSD
I0dαSP
|hSP |2
)
P
(
μσ2dαSD
I0dαSP
|hSP |2 < |hSD|2
)
= 1− μσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
. (18)
Then, the COP for μ ≥ 0 is given by
pco = 1− μσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
max (μ, 2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
. (19)
Substituting (5) into (7), the SOP for the threshold-based
protocol is derived as
pso =
EΦE
⎧⎨⎩∫
I0d
α
SP ZΦE
(2RB−RS−1)N0
0 exp
(
−
(
μσ2dαSD
I0dαSP
+1
)
y
)
dy
⎫⎬⎭
I0dαSP
/
(μσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP )
= 1− LZΦE
(
μσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (20)
where LZΦE (s) = exp
(−2πλEs2/α/αΓ (1− 2α)Γ ( 2α)) is
the Laplace transform of ZΦE . Substituting (1) and (5) into (9),
the TSOP for this protocol is derived as (21), which is shown
at the top of next page.
IV. OPTIMAL DESIGNS FOR SECRECY THROUGHPUT
MAXIMIZATION
In the section, we optimize the design of each transmission
protocol for maximizing the secrecy throughput subject to
the secrecy outage probability constraint and the connection
outage probability constraint. For each transmission protocol,
we first investigate the feasible constraints under which a
non-zero secrecy throughput is achievable. We then obtain
the optimal solution of the designable parameter, i.e., r for
the secrecy guard zone protocol or μ for the threshold-based
protocol.
A. Secrecy Guard Zone
For the secrecy guard zone protocol, the designable param-
eter is the radius of the guard zone, r. Then, we formulate the
optimization problem as
P1: max
r
η(r) = ptx(r) (1− ptso(r))RS ,
s.t. pso ≤ ε, pco ≤ δ, r ≥ 0.
(22)
1) Feasibility of Constraints: We find that the SOP in (14)
is a decreasing function of r, and lim
r→∞ pso = 0. We also find
that the COP in (13) is independent with r. Thus, the feasible
constraint range for the secrecy guard zone protocol is given
by
{(ε, δ) : 0 < ε ≤ 1, δ1 ≤ δ ≤ 1} . (23)
where δ1 is the COP of secrecy guard zone in (13).
ptso = 1− P
(
log2 (1 + γE) < RB −RS & log2 (1 + γD) > RB |1(C2) = 1
)
= 1− μσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
max (μ, 2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
LZΦE
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (21)
2) Optimal Design: The optimal design parameter r∗ of
the P1 is given by
r∗ =
{
0, if ε1 < ε ≤ 1
rLB, if 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε1, (24)
where
rLB = φ
1/α
⎛⎝(B−1−α ln(1−ε)
2πλEφ
1/α
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
))−1
− 1
⎞⎠1/α (25)
with φ = I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2 and B
−1
x (p, q) representing the
inverse function of Bx (p, q).
Proof: Substituting (12) and (16) into (10), the secrecy
throughput η for the secrecy guard zone can be derived as a
closed-form expression. Taking first-order derivative of η with
respect to r, we can obtain ∂η(r,μ)∂r < 0. This implies that
the secrecy throughput is a decreasing function of radius, r.
Therefore, it is wise to set r to the minimum value considering
the secrecy constraint. For brevity, the detailed proof is omitted
here. 
B. Threshold-Based Protocol
For the threshold-based protocol, the designable parameter
is the SNR threshold, μ. Then, we formulate the optimization
problem as
P2: max
μ
η(μ) = ptx(μ) (1− ptso(μ))RS ,
s.t. pso ≤ ε, pco ≤ δ, μ ≥ 0.
(26)
1) Feasibility of Constraints: We find that the COP in (19)
is a decreasing function of μ and when μ ≥ 2RB − 1, pco is
equal to zero. We also find the SOP in (20) is an increasing
function of μ. To be specific, when δ ≥ δ1, the minimum value
of ε can be achieved by setting μ to zero, which is given by
ε1 = 1− LZΦE
(
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (27)
When δ < δ1, by setting pco = δ, we can obtain the minimum
value of the ε as
ε2 = 1− LZΦE
(
(1− δ)
(
2RB−1
)
σ2dαSD+I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (28)
Therefore, the feasible constraint range for the threshold-based
protocol is given by
{(ε, δ) : max (ε1, ε2) ≤ ε ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1} . (29)
2) Optimal Design: The optimal design parameters μ∗ of
the P2 is given by
μ∗ =
{
[ 0, μUB ] , if δ1 < δ ≤ 1
[ μLB, μUB ] , if 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ1, (30)
where
μLB = (1− δ)
(
2RB − 1)− I0dαSP
σ2dαSD
δ, (31)
μUB =min
(
2RB − 1,
( −α ln (1− ε)
2πλEΓ (1− α/2) Γ (α/2)
)α/2
·2
RB−RS − 1
dαSD
− I0d
α
SP
σ2dαSD
)
. (32)
Proof: Substituting (17) and (21) into (10), the secrecy
throughput η for the secrecy guard zone can be derived as
a closed-form expression. We find that when μ > 2RB − 1, η
is a decreasing function of μ. When μ ≤ 2RB − 1, η remains
constant. Therefore, it is wise to have μ ≤ 2RB −1. To satisfy
the secrecy constraint, there is an upper bound of μ. By solving
pso = ε and according to μ ≤ 2RB − 1, we derive the upper
bound as (32). In addition, to satisfy the reliability constraint,
there is a lower bound of μ. By solving pco = δ, we derive the
lower bound as (31). For brevity, the detailed proof is omitted
here. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first illustrate the impact of design
parameters on the studied transmission protocols. We then
compare the achievable performance of the two transmission
protocols based on the proposed optimal designs. The results
shown in this section are all for the network with α = 4,
I0
/
σ2 = 10 dB, RB = 3, RS = 1, dSD = 5 and dSP = 5.
We first demonstrate the impact of the secrecy guard zone
radius r on the performance of secrecy guard zone protocol.
Figure 1 plots ptx, pco, pso, and ptso versus r. As shown in the
figure, both of pso and ptx are decreasing functions of r. This
implies that a high secrecy level is achieved at the cost of a
large transmission delay. Thus, a large radius of the secrecy
guard zone is not always beneficial for real CR networks. In
addition, we find that COP remains constraint with the increase
of the radius, since the COP is not related to the radius of
secrecy guard zone.
We then exam the impact of the SNR threshold μ on the
performance of threshold-based protocol. Figure 2 plots ptx,
pco, pso, and ptso versus μ for threshold-based protocol. As the
figure shows, pco is a decreasing function of μ, and it is equal
to zero when μ ≥ 2RB − 1. The pso is an increasing function
of μ and ptx is a decreasing function of μ. These observations
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Fig. 1. TP, COP, SOP and TSOP for the secrecy guard zone protocol versus
secrecy guard radius r with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3.
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Fig. 2. TP, COP, SOP and TSOP for threshold-based protocol versus the
SNR threshold μ with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3.
imply that a larger SNR-threshold can enhance the reliability
performance while harm the secrecy performance and the
transmission delay performance. Consequently, ptso, which
characterizes the joint performance of secrecy and reliability,
is not a monotonous function of μ. The ptso firstly decreases
and then increases as μ increases, and ptso is minimized at
μ = 2RB − 1. According to these observations, the designers
of real CR networks can wisely set up the SNR threshold to
balance the tradeoff among the delay, secrecy, and reliability
performance of the network.
Next, we compare the joint secrecy and reliability perfor-
mance of the two transmission protocols. Figure 3 plots ptso
versus the eavesdropper density λE . As depicted in the figure,
ptso is an increasing function of λE for both protocols. We note
that, when the eavesdropper density is low, the threshold-based
protocol outperforms the secrecy guard zone protocol. On the
contrary, when the eavesdropper density is high, the secrecy
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Fig. 3. The TSOP for both of secrecy guard zone and threshold-based
transmission protocols versus the eavesdropper density.
Fig. 4. The optimized secrecy throughput η (bits/s/Hz) for different
transmission protocols as a function of the secrecy constraint ε and the
reliability constraint δ with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3.
guard zone protocol outperforms the threshold-based protocol.
These observations can be explained as follows. When λE
is small, the reliability performance dominates the overall
performance of the transmission. When λE is high, the secrecy
performance dominates the overall performance.
Finally, we compare the achievable secrecy throughput for
different transmission protocols by Figure 4. We present the
result achieved by simple transmission without any technique,
namely full activity protocol, for comparison. That is, the
full activity protocol simply transmit messages all the time
without either the threshold-based protocol or the secrecy
guard zone. We plot the achievable secrecy throughput versus
the secrecy constraint ε and the reliability constraint δ. As
shown in the figure, the secrecy guard zone protocol can
achieve the non-zero secrecy throughput under more stringent
secrecy constraint, compared with the full activity protocol.
The threshold-based protocol can achieve the non-zero secrecy
throughput under more stringent reliability constraint, com-
pared with the full activity protocol. Therefore, we summarize
the wise choices of different transmission protocols under
different conditions as follows. When the secrecy constraint is
stringent but the reliability constraint is loose, it is preferable
to adopt the secrecy guard zone protocol. When the reliability
constraint is stringent but the secrecy constraint is loose, it is
preferable to adopt the threshold-based protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secure communication in
an underlay CR network with multiple movable eavesdrop-
pers with a HPPP location entity at each snapshot of time.
Importantly, the location set of eavesdroppers is assumed
unknown at the legitimate side. We considered the scenario
where the SU-Tx sends confidential messages to the SU-
Rx with an instantaneous power constraint in order not to
interfere the PU. To achieve PLS in such a CR network, we
proposed two transmission protocols according to different
assumptions on the channel knowledge at SU-Tx and the
location knowledge about the eavesdroppers. We comprehen-
sively analyzed the transmission delay, secrecy, reliability, and
overall performance of each transmission protocol. Moreover,
we optimized the design parameters (r or μ) to maximize the
secrecy throughput for the proposed transmission protocols.
Our results showed that the secrecy guard zone protocol
is preferred when the secrecy constraint is stringent and
the threshold-based protocol is preferred when the reliability
constraint is stringent.
It is worth mentioning that a hybrid transmission protocol
can be further developed when the SU-Tx is able to detect the
existence of eavesdroppers within its vicinity and obtain the
one-bit feedback from the SU-Rx. For the hybrid protocol, the
SU-Tx adopts a joint secrecy guard zone and threshold-based
transmission strategy. The performance analysis as well as the
joint optimal design of such a hybrid protocol can be found
in a full version of this work [30].
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